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in July of 2003.CIBLAGE ET TAXATION REDISTRIBUTIVE
Nous ´ etudions le probl` eme de la taxation optimale dans une soci´ et´ e qui peut ˆ etre seg-
ment´ ee en groupes cibl´ es. Dans des situations plausibles, le syst` eme de taxation sera plus
redistributif dans le groupe comprenant une proportion relativement plus ´ elev´ ee d’agents
a productivit´ e ´ elev´ ee. Ensuite nous ´ etudions le probl` eme de la taxation optimale lorsque
la segmentation concerne des diﬀ´ erences de besoins, un groupe devant consommer davan-
tage que les autres pour atteindre un niveau de satisfaction donn´ e. Nous montrons que la
compensation accord´ ee pour ces diﬀ´ erences de besoins varie selon que la taxation reﬂ` ete
cette segmentation par les besoins.1. Introduction
The standard optimal redistributive taxation model assumes that households are dis-
tributed over some private characteristic, such as ability, whose distribution is common
knowledge. Redistribution policy is constrained by incentive constraints that must be sat-
isﬁed if households are to reveal their true ability-types (Mirrlees, 1971; Stiglitz, 1982).
There are many circumstances in which the population may be disaggregated into groups
using some observable characteristic, or ‘tag’ to use the terminology introduced by Akerlof
(1978), which is correlated with ability. For example, households may be identiﬁed with
the region of their residence, with some demographic characteristic, such as gender or age,
or with some physical attribute, such as a health condition or a special need. As long as
the distribution of abilities is known to diﬀer within households of diﬀerent characteristics
or tags, this additional information should be useful in enhancing redistribution policy.
The government is then able to redistribute both among diﬀerent ability-types within each
tagged group and between groups. While incentive constraints apply within each group,
they do not apply between groups since the tag is observable.1
In this paper, we study various aspects of the optimal redistributive tax structure when the
population can be disaggregated into tagged groups. To make the analysis manageable and
to obtain qualitative results, we focus on the case where there are two ability types (high-
and low-ability) and two tagged groups, although the results can be readily generalized to
the multi-type case.2 We begin with the case in which the tag has no further normative
1 Much of the literature on tagging, also referred to as categorical transfers, simpliﬁes the within
group redistribution problem by assuming that incomes are ﬁxed. Examples include Parsons
(1996), Keen (1992) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1994). An extension to the case in which
labor supply is variable may be found in Salani´ e (2002).
2 Immonen et al (1998) have studied the pattern of optimal marginal income tax rates in a
simulated model with continuous abilities and two tagged groups. Their analysis relies on sim-
ulations to obtain suggestive results. Comparative static results on optimal non-linear income
tax structures are notoriously scarce. One example can be found in Weymark (1987). He
considers the eﬀect on the tax structure of changes in social welfare weights and individual
preferences rather than changes in the distribution of abilities, which is our concern. See also
the recent paper by Brett and Weymark (2004). Viard (2001a,b) studies tagging in a linear
income taxation context in which a common marginal tax rate applies economy-wide and the
lump-sum component diﬀers across tagged groups. There are no needs diﬀerences between
1signiﬁcance: it serves simply to separate the population into identiﬁable groups, each of
which has a distribution of ability-types. We ﬁnd that under reasonable circumstances, the
tax system will be more redistributive in the tagged group that has a higher proportion of
high-ability persons. Moreover, inter-group redistribution will always go from the group
with a higher proportion of high-ability types to that with a lower proportion. Of course,
such a system may be resisted because, if the tagging characteristic has no direct utility
consequences, a diﬀerentiated tax system violates the principle of horizontally equity.
We then extend the analysis to the case where the tag does have welfare signiﬁcance.
Suppose households vary by needs, where diﬀerences in needs refer to diﬀerences in the
amount of resources required to achieve a given level of utility. This might, for example,
be due to a medical condition or a disability. Modeling needs in this way avoids problems
of non-comparability of utilities that would arise if needs were reﬂected in diﬀerent utility
functions. Following Rowe and Woolley (1999) and Boadway and Pestieau (2003b), we
consider the case in which needs reﬂect diﬀerences in consumption requirements.3 House-
holds now vary by two characteristics — ability and needs — which are assumed to be
imperfectly correlated. While ability is private information to the households, needs are
observable and can be used as a tag. Inter-group transfers now take on an additional re-
sponsibility — that of compensating for diﬀerences in needs. In a full-information setting,
needs would be fully compensated by lump-sum transfers, and lump-sum redistribution
would also apply between ability-types. The same principle extends to the imperfect-
information case in a natural way. Again, horizontal equity will typically be violated,
and that may be a concern. We consider the level of compensation for needs when the
income tax schedule cannot be diﬀerentiated by needs group, whether for horizontal equity
or other reasons. This is the case considered by Rowe and Woolley (1999). The level of
compensation given for needs in this case exceeds the level of needs if a higher proportion
of low-ability households are needy, and vice versa.
tagged groups.
3 The alternative case in which needs reﬂect diﬀerent leisure requirements is considered in a
diﬀerent context in Boadway and Pestieau (2003a).
2Strangely enough, the issue at hand, namely optimal taxation with tagging and transfers
between tagged groups, has received little attention in the literature. There is the excep-
tion of Immonen et al (1998) already mentioned. They explore the design of an optimal
income tax when some categorical information is available, and show that the use of such
information may entail important gains. Unlike our paper, they mainly resort to simula-
tions to obtain some results. Another paper by Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) explores the
incidence of diﬀerent proportions of skilled-unskilled workers on the income tax schedule
and on post-tax utility. From there, they show the eﬀect of interregional mobility of either
skilled or non-skilled on social welfare.
Income taxation with tagging raises questions of ethics and of political feasibility. Starting
with the ﬁrst, consider a country with two observable groups, the Greens and the Blues,
where it is known that the proportion of skilled workers is much higher among the Greens
than among the Blues. Even if we show that diﬀerentiating tax policy according to people’s
color accompanied by transfers from the Greens to the Blues dominates a unique tax
system from a welfarist point of view, it may be diﬃcult to implement. As mentioned,
segmenting tax policy generates horizontal inequities and violates principles of neutrality,
and these may be regarded as undesirable from an ethical point of view.4 As to the political
feasibility, take a country with two regions having a diﬀerent mix of skilled and unskilled.
Again, designing a separate tax schedule for each of the two regions with transfers from
the region with the better endowment in human capital to the other one is to be preferred
on welfarism grounds. Yet, the mere existence of such transfers underlines the dependence
of one region on the other and can lead to separatist, or at least egoistic, reactions. By
keeping a single tax schedule these aspects do not appear in the spotlight.5
4 The use of tagging to separate persons might also be resisted by those being tagged because
of the stigma that might be involved. Evidence of less than complete take-up rates in welfare
schemes, such as that reported in Hernanz et al (2004), supports this. For an analysis of the
eﬀects of stigmatization on the optimal use of tagged transfers, see Jacquet and Van der Linden
(2003).
5 The conﬂict between horizontal equity and social welfare maximization has been recognized in
the ﬁscal federalism literature. The consequences of this conﬂict for the design of intergovern-
mental ﬁscal relations is discussed in Boadway (2004). Of course, it is also the case that if the
3We proceed in the following section by setting up our basic model in the absence of tagging.
We then consider the case of tagging where the tag reﬂects no diﬀerence in household
utilities. Then we extend the analysis to the case where the tag aplies to persons with
diﬀerent needs. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2. The Basic Model without Tagging
Obtaining analytical results in general optimal income tax models is notoriously diﬃcult,
which accounts for the important role that simulations have played. Our strategy is to
specify a model that does allow for qualitative results. Obviously this detracts from the
generality of the results, but it does serve to highlight the intuition and some of the
main inﬂuences at work. Our model specializes the standard Mirrlees-Stiglitz optimal
income tax model in two main ways. First, we adopt a quasi-linear-in-consumption additive
speciﬁcation for household utility. This utility function, also used by Diamond (1998),
essentially eliminates income eﬀects from labor supply. Second, the social welfare function
we use exhibits constant absolute aversion to inequality, as opposed to the more standard
constant relative aversion to inequality form. This implies that social indiﬀerence curves,
instead of being homothetic, are parallel in a 45o direction. Other properties of social
preferences are preserved, such as the Pareto property, symmetry in household utilities
and, to ensure non-negative aversion to inequality, concavity.6 Otherwise, the standard
assumptions of optimal income taxation apply.
Following Stiglitz (1982), we restrict the number of household ability-types to two, al-
though as we shall indicate the results can readily be extended to the multi-type case as
in Guesnerie and Seade (1982). Households may be one of two ability levels, high-ability
w2 and low-ability w1, with w2 >w 1, where wi corresponds with the wage rate of a type-i
household. The proportion of low-ability households in the population is given by π,s o
tag is interpreted as region of residence, the possibility of migration would reduce the beneﬁts
of diﬀerential tax structures by region as well.
6 The social choice foundations of this social welfare function are discussed in Bossert and Wey-
mark (2002), who refer to it as the symmetric Kolm-Pollak social welfare ordering, after Kolm
(1969) and Pollak (1971). It requires that household utility functions satisfy translation-scale
measurability and be fully comparable between households.
41 − π are high-ability. For simplicity, we normalize total population to unity.
Initially, we assume that all households have the same preferences, given by the quasi-linear
form c−h(`), with h0(`),h 00(`) > 0, where c is composite consumption and ` is labor. We
can regard this as an ordinal utility function, leaving measurability as a matter for social
judgment by the government/planner. Since income is given by y = wi`, we can rewrite
our utility metric in terms of before- and after-tax income for a type-i household as:
xi ≡ c − h(y/wi)
In what follows, we refer to xi as the real income of a type-i household.
Social utility for a type-i household, denoted by u(xi), is given by u(xi)=−e−ρxi, with
0 6 ρ 6 ∞. Social welfare is then the sum of social utilities:
w(x1,x 2)=πu(x1)+( 1− π)u(x2)=−πe−ρx1 − (1 − π)e−ρx2 (1)
Note that ρ = −u00(x)/u0(x). This can be interpreted as the coeﬃcient of absolute inequal-
ity aversion. Given the deﬁnition of social welfare in (1), the slope of a social indiﬀerence
















This implies, as noted, that social indiﬀerence curves are parallel in a 45o direction. For ρ =
0, we have the utilitarian case with linear social indiﬀerence curves: w(·)=πx1+(1−π)x2.
For ρ = ∞, we have maximin.
The Income Possibilities Frontier
A useful pedagogical device in this simple economy is the Pareto frontier in household real
income space, referred to as the second-best Income Possibilities Frontier or IPF. A point
on the IPF where the incentive constraint on high-ability households is binding (that is,











c2 − h(y2/w2) − m > 0( µ)
c2 − h(y2/w2) − c1 + h(y1/w2) > 0( γ)
π(y1 − c1)+( 1− π)(y2 − c2)+R > 0( λ)
In this problem, m is the predetermined real income level of type-2 households; the second
constraint is the incentive constraint applying to the high-ability types; and the third
constraint is the resource constraint, assuming for simplicity that there is an exogenously
given amount of revenue R available. The equation labels refer to the respective Lagrangian
multipliers for the constraints. Thus, the Lagrangian expression is:
L = c1 − h(y1/w1)+µ[c2 − h(y2/w2) − m]+γ [c2 − h(y2/w2) − c1 + h(y1/w2)]
+λ[π(y1 − c1)+( 1− π)(y2 − c2)+R]
The ﬁrst-order conditions reduce to the following:
µ = λ − 1,γ =1− λπ (2)
h0(y2/w2)=w2 (3)
(1 − λπ)h0 (y1/w2)/w2 + λπ − h0 (y1/w1)/w1 = 0 (4)
π (y1 − h(y1/w2) − m)+( 1− π)(y2 − h(y2/w2) − m)+R = 0 (5)
Equation (3) is the familiar zero-marginal-tax-rate-at-the-top condition. An advantage of
our assumption about preferences is that (3) pins down y2, so that we can take y2 as given
in what follows. Then, (4) and (5) determine y1 and λ in terms of m, R and π.7
More generally, the solution to the above problem yields the value function x1(m,R,π).










= λ[(y1−c1)−(y2−c2)] = λ[t1−t2] < 0 (6)
7 We assume in what follows that y1 > 0 in the optimum so that we have an interior solution. A
suﬃcient condition for this is that h0(0) be arbitrarily small.
6where ti is the tax paid by a type−i person. Thus, −µ =1− λ is the slope of the IPF.
The shape of the IPF can be determined by investigating how λ changes with m, the real
income given for type-2 households. Note ﬁrst that if the incentive constraint on type-2
households is not binding, γ = 0. From the ﬁrst-order conditions on (c1) and (c2), we
have −µ = −(1− π)/π, so the IPF is linear. Suppose next that the incentive constraint is







[π(1 − h0(y1/w2))/w2]2 =
dµ
dm
In what follows we assume that ∂µ/∂m > 0, so that the IPF is strictly concave. This
will be the case if (1 − λπ)h00(y1/w2)/w2
2 − h00(y1/w1)/w2
1 < 0, which is just the second-
order condition for a maximin optimum.8 More generally, the condition will be satisﬁed if
h00(y1/w2) 6 h00(y1/w1), or h000(y/w) > 0. A quadratic labor cost function will be suﬃcient
for this inequality to hold.
Figure 1 illustrates. The curve extending through L, S, A and M illustrates a typical
IPF. The point L is the laissez-faire allocation. The IPF is linear until the point S, where
the incentive constraint is binding. The point M is the maximin point, considered further
below. With no aversion to real income inequality (ρ = 0), points along the segment LS
are all socially optimal. For positive but ﬁnite aversion to inequality the optimal point will
lie between S and M, such as at the point A. The ﬁrst-best IPF is shown as a dashed line.
Since the incentive constraint is not binding in the ﬁrst best (because of full information),
the slope is −µ = −(1−π)/π throughout. Recall that the slope of social indiﬀerence curves
will also be −(1−π)/π in the utilitarian case where ρ = 0. In this case, the laissez-faire is
socially optimal, and there is no case for policy intervention. In what follows, we therefore
assume that ρ>0.
The IPF will shift with a change in either π or R, both of which are of interest to us.
Consider each in turn.
8 The maximin problem is max c1 − h(y1/w1) subject to conditions (γ) and (λ). Substitution
from the constraints makes this equivalent to max πy1 +( 1− π)[y2 + h(y1/w2) − h(y2/w2)]
+R−h(y1/w1) with respect to y1 (since y2 is determined by (3)). The second-order condition
for this problem is as stated.
7Eﬀect of Changes in π on the IPF
Changes in π cause the entire IPF to shift in (x2,x 1)−space. An indication of the eﬀects
of changing π on the IPF can be obtained in principle by solving for ∂λ/∂π from (4) and
(5) above. However, the resulting expression is of ambiguous sign so oﬀers little insight.
It is more useful to characterize shifts in the IPF with reference to particular optimal
allocations.
Consider the planning problem for a given speciﬁcation for social utility, u(x1), that is, for
a given choice of the coeﬃcient of absolute inequality aversion, ρ. Using the deﬁnition of
real income xi, the second-best planning problem can be written:
max πu(x1)+( 1− π)u(x2)( A)
subject to
x2 − x1 + h(y1/w2) − h(y1/w1) > 0( γ)
π (y1 − x1 − h(y1/w1)) + (1 − π)(y2 − x2 − h(y2/w2)) + R > 0( λ)
where the constraints (γ) and (λ) are as before the incentive constraint and the government
revenue constraint. The ﬁrst-order conditions reduce, after substituting out the Lagrangian
multipliers, to the following equation:
(1 − π)[u0(x1) − u0(x2)][h0(y1/w2)/w2 − h0(y1/w1)/w1] (7)
+[πu0(x1)+( 1− π)u0(x2)][1 − h0(y1/w1)/w1]=0
This equation, along with constraints (γ) and (λ), constitute three equations in x1, x2 and
y1 (where y2 is again determined by the no-distortion-at-the-top condition (3)).








=( t1 − t2)[Cy1 + Cx1(θ21 − θ11)] − Cπ[(1 − θ11)π − (θ21 − θ11)π] > < 0 (9)
where
θ11 ≡ h0 (y1/w1)/w1,θ 21 ≡ h0 (y1/w2)/w2
8Cx1 =( 1− π)[(θ21 − θ11)+π(1 − θ21)]u
00(x1) > < 0
Cx2 =( 1− π)(1 − θ21)u00(x2) < 0





Cπ =( u0(x1) − u0(x2))(1 − θ21) > 0
and D<0 is the determinant of the matrix of derivatives of the endogenous variables. Its
sign and that of Cy1 are determined by the second-order conditions, which we assume are
satisﬁed.






if (t2 − t1)(Cx2 + Cx1) − Cπ < 0
that is, if
(t2 − t1)[u00(x1)(θ21 − θ11)+( πu00(x1)+( 1− π)u00(x2))(1 − θ21)]
−(u0(x1) − u0(x2))(1 − θ21) < 0 (10)
It is straightforward to show that this condition is satisﬁed when the social utility function
exhibits constant absolute inequality aversion: u(xi)=−e−ρxi. To see this, substitute
ρ = −u00(xi)/u0(xi) into (7) to obtain:
u00(x1)(θ21 − θ11)+[ πu00(x1)+( 1− π)u00(x2)][1 − θ21]=0
Using this, (10) becomes:







for any value of ρ>0. As well, dx1/dπ < 0, while dx2/dπ < 0.
9Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect on the IPF of an increase in the proportion of low-ability
households, π. The laissez faire point L remains unchanged, while the point S at which
the incentive constraint is just binding moves inward along a 45o line. The maximin point
M, where ρ = ∞, and the point A, where 0 <ρ<∞, move in a direction that is steeper
than 45o.9
Eﬀect of Changes in R on the IPF
An increase in government revenue availability R causes the entire IPF to shift outwards
in a 45o direction. To see this, consider a point along the IPF where the self-selection
constraint is binding. In (y,c)−space, it can be characterized as a standard Stiglitz-type
separating equilibrium with indiﬀerence curves for ability-types 1 and 2, where type 2’s
indiﬀerence curve intersects type 1’s at the latter’s bundle (y1,c 1). Since utility is quasi-
linear in c, indiﬀerence curves are parallel vertically.
Consider now an increase in revenue ∆R. If both c1 and c2 increase by ∆R, holding y1 and
y2 constant, all equilibrium conditions are still satisﬁed, including the budget constraint,
the self-selection constraint, and the tax structure. Therefore, a change in R causes the
entire IPF to shift in a 45o degree direction.
We are now in a position to consider the eﬀects of tagging. We begin with the case in which
tagging has no welfare consequences. It simply separates households into two groups with
diﬀerent ability distributions. Subsequently, we take up the case where tagging corresponds
9 If social utility exhibits constant relative aversion to income inequality (u(xi)=x
1−ρ
i /(1−ρ)),
Figure 2 may not apply. In this case, using ρ = −u00(xi)xi/u0(xi) and (7), the lefthand side of
(10) becomes:
(t2 − t1)(1 − π)u
00(x2)(1 − x2/x1) − (u
0(x1) − u
0(x2))
Since the terms being subtracted are both positive, (10) is not necessarily satisﬁed so we cannot
say unambiguously how x1 changes relative to x2 as π changes. However, as ρ →∞ , condition
(10) will be satisﬁed. Substitute u00(x2)=−u0(x2)ρ/x2 into the above to get:
−(t2 − t1)(1 − π)ρ(1 − x2/x1)/x2 − ((x2/x1)
ρ − 1)
As ρ increases, (x2/x1)ρ goes to ∞ more rapidly than ρ goes to ∞ by l’Hˆ opital’s Rule. Therefore,
expression (10) becomes negative for ρ large enough.
10with a diﬀerence in needs between tagged and untagged persons.
3. Tagging with No Needs Diﬀerences
Suppose the population can be divided into two groups with diﬀerent proportions of ability-
type 1’s, π>π . For simplicity, assume the groups are of equal size, so π + π =2 π.I n
this section, the only thing that distinguishes the two groups is the skill distribution of
the population. For example, the two groups could be treated as separate regions within
the same country. In this case, our discussion above of the eﬀect of changes in π on the
IPF can be applied directly. These two groups will have IPF’s that bracket that of the
two groups taken together — the pooling IPF — as shown in Figure 3. Note that the
points S, S and S where the self-selection constraints are just binding all lie along a 45o
line, while the maximin points M, M and M and the social utilitarian points A, A and A
each line up along a locus that is steeper than 45o. For any value of ρ>0, type 1’s are
unambiguously worse oﬀ in the tagged group that has a higher proportion of low-ability
types (π), while type 2’s could be better oﬀ or worse oﬀ. In that sense, we can say that
the tax structure is more progressive the lower the proportion of low-ability types there
are in the population. Moreover, tagging generally makes some of both ability types worse
oﬀ than pooling. This characterization follows directly from Figure 3.
The IPFs for the tagged groups in Figure 3 involve only intra-group redistribution. Since
the government is able to observe which persons are in each group, lump-sum inter-group
transfers will be possible. We can now show that such transfers will be desirable, and will
go from the π to the π group.
To show this, we establish ﬁrst that any point along the pooling IPF can be replicated by
a set of transfers (T,T) between the two tagged groups combined with the same common
optimal income tax structure in each group. To see this, note that the government budget
in the pooling equilibrium is:
2πt1 + 2(1 − π)t2 =0
where t1 and t2 are the taxes levied on the two ability types. To ﬁnance the same pooling
11tax schedule in the two tagged groups, the following budgets must be satisﬁed:
πt1 +( 1− π)t2 = T and πt1 +( 1− π)t2 = T
Adding these together, we obtain:
T + T =( π + π)t1 +( 1− π +1− π)t2 =2 πt1 + 2(1 − π)t2 =0
by the pooled budget constraint. Recall from above that an increase in revenues R given
to a group causes its IPF to shift outward in a 45o direction, and vice versa. Therefore,
any given point on the pooled IPF can be disaggregated into intersecting IPFs for the two
tagged groups by a transfer from group π to group π. We expect that at the point of
intersection, the IPF for the π group (whose IPF is shifted down) will be steeper than that
for the π group (whose IPF is shifted up).
These eﬀects of inter-group transfers can be used to characterize optimal tagging outcomes
for given speciﬁcations of the government’s objectives. It is useful to discuss separately
the maximin case and the case of ﬁnite aversion to inequality.
The Maximin Optimum with Tagging
The maximin outcome on the pooled IPF is the point M in Figure 4. This point can be
achieved by a set of lump-sum transfers T and T between the tagged groups, combined
with applying the pooled maximin solution tax structure in each tagged group. The ﬁgure
also indicates the IPFs for the two groups π and π given the inter-group transfers. Note
that at the point M, the IPF for π is steeper than that for π. This follows from the
facts that i) the transfers T and T will shift the two IPFs in a 45o direction and ii) the
points M and M in Figure 3 are lined up along a locus that is steeper than 45o. Since
the intersection point is at a peak for the pooled case, this implies that the peaks for the
two groups are on either side of that for the pooled case, and unambiguously above it
vertically. The full maximin will generally require further redistribution from one group
to another since the low-ability persons will generally have diﬀerent real income levels in
Figure 3. Nonetheless, both persons will end up being better oﬀ than in the pooled case.
12The following results are apparent for the maximin case:
1. The worst-oﬀ person in both groups can be made better oﬀ by moving from the pooled
maximin case to two separate maximin outcomes with diﬀerent tax schedules and inter-
group lump-sum transfers.
2. In the full maximin optimum with two separate tax schedules, the type-2’s are worse
oﬀ in tagged group π, that is, the one with a lower proportion of low-ability types. In
other words, the tax is more progressive in the tagged group with the highest proportion
of high-ability types.
For future reference, note that the optimal tagging outcome with two separate tax schedules
violates the principle of horizontal equity. In this maximin case, high-ability types are
treated diﬀerently by the tax system depending solely on which group they ﬁnd themselves
in. If horizontal equity is an objective that must be satisﬁed, only the pooled outcome
would be possible.
Tagging With Finite Absolute Aversion to Inequality
In this sub-section, we focus on outcomes for an aversion to inequality parameter ρ such
that 0 <ρ<∞. This corresponds with point A in Figure 2. As the ﬁgure indicates,
as π increases, point A moves southwest along a locus that is steeper than 450 (and
either positive or negative). Point A0 is one point along that locus. Figure 3 uses this
ﬁnding to depict how real income combinations will deviate from the pooled optimum
when households are separated into tagged groups with diﬀerent values of π, assuming
there are no inter-group transfers. As the ﬁgure indicates, social welfare will be higher
in the group with the lowest proportion of low-ability types, π. Moreover, tagging in the
absence of inter-group transfers will reduce social welfare in the π group. This suggests
that there will be some scope for inter-group transfers. It turns out that tagging combined
with lump-sum inter-group transfers can make social welfare in both groups higher that it
is in the pooling optimum.10 As well, progressivity is higher in the tagged group with the
10 Of course, aggregate social welfare will necessarily rise when tagging combined with inter-group
13lowest proportion of low-ability types.
To see this, we ﬁrst show that, starting in the tagged outcomes (A,A) depicted in Figure 3
with no inter-group transfers, lump-sum redistribution should go from the π-group to the
π-group. Denote by xi and xi the levels of real income obtained by type−i households in
the two tagged groups. In the absence of inter-group transfers, social welfare levels satisfy
w(x1,x2) <w (x1,x 2) since social welfare is decreasing in π by the envelope theorem
applied to problem (A). Using (1), this implies:
−πe−ρx1 − (1 − π)e−ρx2 < −πe−ρx1 − (1 − π)e−ρx2 (11)
We know from above that a change in R causes c1 and c2 to change by the same amount,
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Therefore, when the population is separated into two groups, the planner will want
to redistribute lump-sum from the π−group to the π−group until: dw(x1,x2)/dR =
dw(x1,x 2)/dR or,
πe
−ρx1 +( 1− π)e
−ρx2 = πe
−ρx1 +( 1− π)e
−ρx2
transfers is used, regardless of the form of individual and social utility functions, as a referee
has pointed out. The no-tagging outcome is always a feasible choice when tagging can be used.
If the optimal outcome involves tagging with diﬀerent tax structures in the tagged groups,
social welfare will be higher by revealed preference. More formally, in the no tagging case,
social welfare is a convex function of the distribution of ability types, say, V (F). When tagging
allows the distribution to be divided into two sub-distributions F1,F 2 in the proportions λ1,λ 2,
convexity of social welfare V (·) implies V (F) 6 λ1V (F1)+λ2V (F2), where the equality only
applies if the optimal tax schedule is the same for F1 and F2 (e.g., if the two distributions are
of the same form).
14Consider now the eﬀect of redistributing between the two groups. We know that we can
redistribute between groups to achieve the common pooled solution A. At the common
pooled solution, the IPFs for the two groups will intersect since the redistribution causes
the curves to move in a 45o direction. Point A on π’s new IPF will be to the left of A
and on a higher social indiﬀerence curve, while A on π’s new IPF will be to the right of A
and also on a higher social indiﬀerence curve, as shown in Figure 5. Within each tagged
group, social welfare can then be increased by moving from the pooled tax structure at
A to group-speciﬁc tax structures at A and A. Then, there could be further inter-group
redistribution between π and π, but both groups will end up being better oﬀ than at A.
Thus, tagging is unambiguously welfare improving.
These results parallel those obtained in the maximin case. They can be summarized as
follows:
1. Social welfare within each tagged group can be improved compared with the pool-
ing outcome by making lump-sum transfers from group π to group π and adopting a
separate income tax structure within each tagged group.
2. The income tax structure will be more progressive in terms of real income in the group
with the lower proportion of low-ability households: x1/x2 > x1/x2.
3. Horizontal equity will be violated in the tagging solution in the sense that otherwise
identical households will be treated diﬀerently depending on which tagged group they
belong to.
Extensions
Intuition suggests that these results can be extended to more complicated settings. The
extension to more than two tagged groups is straightforward. The groups can be ordered
according to the proportion of the population that are type-1’s. Some groups will have
higher values of π than the pooled population, and some less. The analog of Figure 5 can
be constructed in which the slopes of IPF curves passing through the pooling outcome
will be increasing in π. Combining lump-sum inter-group transfers with group-speciﬁc
15tax structures will increase social welfare within each group compared with the pooled
outcome. And, the progressivity of group tax structures will be falling in π.
There could also be more than two ability types. Although the analysis of optimal income
taxation generalizes in a relatively straightforward way (Guesnerie and Seade, 1982), tag-
ging becomes more complicated. Two conceptual issues arise. First, the comparison of
ability distributions across tagged groups becomes ambiguous unless the densities satisfy
single-crossing attributes. Second, tagging may result in diﬀerent groups only having sub-
sets of ability-types. Intuition suggests that if the density of ability distributions across
pairs of groups crossed only once, and if all ability-types were in all groups, the analog of
the above results should apply. Social welfare within each group should be increased by
inter-group transfers and group-speciﬁc tax structures, and tax schedules should be more
progressive in groups that have more skill-intensive ability distributions.
We have already indicated that the results do not generalize unambiguously to the case
of social utility functions that exhibit constant relative inequality aversion. Moreover,
they will not extend to more general formulations of household preferences. In these cases,
qualitative results will not be possible, though presumably the intuition of the above results
will still apply.
4. Tagging with Needs Diﬀerences
In this section, we assume that tagging is associated with diﬀerences in household needs for
resources to achieve a given utility level. These needs diﬀerences could reﬂect a disability
or medical condition that can be addressed by a transfer of income. To keep matters
simple and tractable, we assume that households can be of two needs types: the needy
and the non-needy. All needy households regardless of their ability require an additional
amount of consumption goods n to obtain comparable utility to the non-needy.11 Given
11 This formulation of needs was introduced into the optimal redistribution literature by Rowe
and Woolley (1999). Notice that it is analogous to Stone-Geary preferences. Boadway and
Pestieau (2003a,b) also consider the eﬀects for redistribution of diﬀerences in needs for leisure.
In this formulation, unlike with consumption needs, the cost of needs is increasing in the wage
rate. Since the government cannot observe wages, this makes optimal policy more complicated.
16our quasi-linear in consumption formulation, preferences for the non-needy are as before
c − h(y/wi) ≡ xi (i =1 ,2), while those for the needy are c − n − h(y/wi) ≡ xi (i =1 ,2).
This quasi-linear formulation constrains our analysis besides simplifying it. It constrains
it because preference orderings in (y,c)−space for households of given ability but diﬀerent
needs are identical. Therefore, the single-crossing property does not apply and they cannot
be separated. Nonetheless, social utility will diﬀer for the two households: u(c − y/wi) >
u(c − n − y/wi). At the same time, this formulation of needs simpliﬁes our analysis by
avoiding multi-dimensional screening problems.
The proportion of the population who are needy is φ,s o1− φ are non-needy. Within the
needy group, a proportion π are low-ability (type 1), while within the non-needy group
the proportion is π. In principle, π R π, but special attention will be paid to the case
where needs are negatively correlated with ability, so π>π .
As a benchmark, it is useful to characterize the ﬁrst-best outcome in which the planner can
observe both the ability and the needs of each household. Lump-sum transfers can be made
both between needs groups and between ability groups. For any strictly positive value of
aversion to inequality ρ, diﬀerences in needs n will be fully compensated for regardless of
ability: u(xi)=u(xi),(i =1 ,2). Then, lump-sum transfers will be made between ability
groups depending on the extent of aversion to inequality. Given our assumption that
household preferences are quasi-linear, utilities will be equalized for any positive aversion
to inequality (ρ>0).12 Therefore, in the ﬁrst-best optimum with positive aversion to
inequality, equality of real incomes for all households prevails. x1 = x2 = x1 = x2.
When abilities are not observable, the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved. In fact, the incentive
constraint precludes low-ability types from reaching the level of utility of high-ability types.
The problem is analogous to the Mirrlees-Stiglitz optimal income tax problem except that
diﬀerences in needs must be accounted for. We proceed by discussing the tagging case
12 This might be contrasted with the celebrated ﬁnding of Mirrlees (1974) that if leisure is a
(strictly) normal good and household utility functions are strictly concave, utility is declining
with ability under utilitarianism. With preferences that are quasi-linear in consumption, leisure
is not strictly normal: its income elasticity of demand is zero.
17in which needy and non-needy groups can be subject to separate income tax schedules,
and then consider the case in which needs must be accounted for in a common income tax
schedule, say, because of horizontal equity considerations.
Tagging with Needs
When the needy and non-needy groups can be separated, the analysis of the previous
section can be adopted in a straightforward way. The redistribution system will include
both distortionary transfers from the high- to the low-ability persons within each of the
needy and non-needy groups, and lump-sum transfers from the non-needy to the needy
group. The latter will simultaneously take account of diﬀerences in need and diﬀerences
in the proportion of high-and low ability types.
Conceptually, inter-group transfers can be separated into the two types. Lump-sum trans-
fers from the non-needy to the needy group will fully compensate for needs diﬀerences.
Let b denote transfers to compensate for need. If b and b are the transfers to the needy
and non-needy groups respectively, and if they are self-ﬁnancing, they will satisfy b−b = n
(full compensation for needs) and φb +( 1− φ)b = 0 (budget balance). These imply that
b = −φn. This needs-compensating transfer applies regardless of the degree of aversion to
inequality ρ, as long as it is strictly positive.
Once needs diﬀerences have been addressed by lump-sum transfers, the problem becomes
exactly analogous to that of the previous section. A lump-sum transfer must be made from
the group with the higher proportion of high-ability types to the other group, and separate
tax structures applied in the two groups. Both the size of the transfer and the structure of
the redistributive income tax will depend on the degree of aversion to inequality ρ. For any
value of ρ>0, the tax will be more progressive in the group with the higher proportion
of high-ability persons.
The direction and overall size of the inter-group transfer depends on the correlation between
needs and abilities. If needs are inversely correlated with abilities, π>π : the needy group
will have the lower proportion of high-ability types. The transfer from the non-needy to
the needy to compensate for needs will reinforce the transfer to compensate for ability
18levels, and the qualitative analysis of the previous section will apply. On the other hand,
in the perhaps less-likely event that needs are correlated with ability (π<π ), the needs
transfer will counteract the ability-level inter-group transfer, and the overall transfer could
in principle go in either way.
In any event, the tagging outcome will violate horizontal equity in the sense that house-
hold of identical real incomes will be treated diﬀerently under the income tax system.
Alternatively, there may be reasons of a political or constitutional reason why diﬀerent tax
schedules cannot be applied to diﬀerent groups. The following case examines how needs
might be accounted for when a common income tax system must apply.
Accounting for Needs without Tagging
The above discussion suggests that needs should be fully compensated for if a diﬀerent
tax schedule can be applied to needy and non-needy groups. Will this still be the case if
a common tax schedule must be applied? Rowe and Woolley (1999) had argued that it
should be. In this subsection, we show that imperfect needs compensation should generally
be used if the planner is restricted to a common tax schedule.
Let b1 and b2 be needs credits (transfers) given to needy households of ability types 1 and
2, respectively. When b1 6= b2, these can be thought of as income-tested components of
the income tax system. We can set b = 0 for the non-needy with no loss of generality.
If the planner is constrained to impose a common income tax system to the two groups,
the policy instruments are income tax variables (c1,y 1,c 2,y 2), which are common to both
needy and non-needy households, as well as b1 and b2. It is useful to formulate the planner’s
problem in two conceptual stages. In the ﬁrst stage, needs credits b1 and b2 are chosen,
and in the second stage the optimal income tax is chosen, given the requirement to ﬁnance
the credits. We can solve the planner’s problem in reverse order.
Given b1 and b2, the planner’s optimal income tax problem is the following one:
max
{ci,yi}
φ{πu(c1 − n + b1 − h(y1/w1)) + (1 − π)u(c2 − n + b2 − h(y2/w2))} (N)
+(1 − φ){πu(c1 − h(y1/w1)) + (1 − π)u(c2 − h(y2/w2))}
19subject to
c2 − h(y2/w2) > c1 − h(y1/w2)( γ)
φ{π(y1 − c1 − b1)+( 1− π)(y2 − c2 − b2)}
+(1 − φ){π(y1 − c1)+( 1− π)(y2 − c2)} =0 ( λ)
The ﬁrst order conditions on ci and yi, given bi, are:
φπu0(x1)+( 1− φ)πu0(x1) − γ − λ[φπ +( 1− φ)π] = 0 (13)
−(φπu0(x1)+( 1− φ)πu0(x1))h(y1/w1)/w1 + γh0(y1/w2)/w2 (14)
+λ[φπ +( 1− φ)π]=0
φ(1 − π)u0(x2)+( 1− φ)(1 − π)u0(x2)+γ − λ[φ(1 − π)+( 1− φ)(1 − π)] = 0 (15)
−(φ(1 − π)u0(x2)+( 1− φ)(1 − π)u0(x2)+γ)h0(y2/w2)/w2 (16)
+λ[φ(1 − π)+( 1− φ)(1 − π)] = 0
The form of the optimal tax structure is the standard one. For example, from (15) and
(16), we obtain the zero-distortion-at-the-top result: h0(y2/w2)=w2. Thus, y2 is the same
regardless of the size of n or bi. Let the value function for this second-stage problem be
deﬁned by W(b1,b2).
In the ﬁrst stage, needs credits bi are chosen, given that they will be ﬁnanced optimally. To
establish whether the need credits will over- or under-compensate for needs, we investigate
the welfare eﬀects of changing the credits beginning at the situation where needs are exactly
fully compensated by credits: b1 = b2 = n. Two alternative cases can be considered. In
the ﬁrst, the needs credit is constrained to be the same for both types, say, because it is
administered separately from the income tax system. In the second case, it is allowed to
diﬀer.
20Case i: b1 = b2 = b
In the initial situation where b = n and a common tax system is applied to all households,






= πu0(x1)+( 1− π)u0(x2) − λ (17)
From ﬁrst-order conditions (13) and (14), we obtain at b = n:
πu0(x1)+( 1− π)u0(x2)=λ (18)






=( π − π)[u0(x1) − u0(x2)] > < 0a sπ > <π
since u0(x1) >u 0(x2). Therefore, if there are a higher proportion of low-ability persons
among the needy than among the non-needy (π>π ), needs should be over-compensated,
and vice versa. Eﬀectively, the needs credit is useful as an instrument for redistribution if
needs are negatively correlated with ability.13
Case ii: b1 6= b2
Suppose we again start from the case where b1 = b2 = n, so initially x1 = x1 ≡ x1 and
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Therefore, in this case, regardless of the distribution of ability-types by need, b1 should be
increased above n, while b2 should be decreased below n. In other words, needs should be
over-compensated for the low ability and under-compensated for the high ability.14
13 The argument is analogous to social insurance being a useful redistributive device is the prob-
ability of ill health is correlated with ability. See the analysis in Boadway et al (2003).
14 Rowe and Woolley (1999) had assumed that needs would be fully compensated for both types
of households.
21The allocation obtained in Case ii is not identical to that obtained when two separate tax
schedules can be chosen in addition to needs credits. The planner does not have enough
degrees of freedom in this case to replicate the tagging solution. It might be argued that
there are no good economic arguments for not applying the full tagging solution if the
government is allowed to give needs credits that deviate from full compensation. This in
itself could be argued to violate horizontal equity. Restricting the tax schedule to be the
same for all persons may be more for administrative than economics purposes.
Extensions
Similar sorts of extensions could be made here as mentioned at the end of the previous
section. These include, for example, multiple ability-types and multiple needs-types. As
well, some other extensions suggest themselves when needs are a relevant characteristic.
First, needs may not be observable. Since needs are not observationally distinct in house-
hold behavior, households cannot be separated by need and no direct compensation can
be given. At best, the progressivity of the income tax will be aﬀected to the extent that
needs are correlated with abilities (positively or negatively).
Second, tagging for needs may be imperfect. That is, there may be Type I and Type
II statistical errors, as in Parsons (1996). In this case, compensation for needs will be
tempered. For example, in the case in which diﬀerent tax structures apply to needy and
non-needy groups, the extent of compensation for needs will be reduced.
Finally, more complicated formulations of needs could be used. For example, there could be
needs in leisure as well as consumption. Even if these take an additive form,15 the analysis
is more complicated than our needs in consumption speciﬁcation. The main reason is that
compensation cannot be paid in leisure but must be paid in consumption goods. However,
even if the needs in leisure is the same for both households, the value of leisure in terms of
consumption goods will diﬀer among households of diﬀerent ability since the opportunity
cost of taking up leisure for needs purposes is the market wage. Thus, compensation for
15 Thus, preferences take the form c − h(` + n), where n are needs in leisure.
22leisure must diﬀer across households of diﬀerent ability. More discussion of this case may
be found in Boadway and Pestieau (2003b).
5. Conclusions
Our ultimate purpose in this paper has been to investigate how special needs for resources
— such as expenditures for medical or disability conditions — ought to be treated in
the income tax system. Rowe and Woolley (1999) had suggested giving universal credit
for such expenditures as part of an optimal non-linear income tax system. Our analysis
suggests the matter is somewhat more complicated than that. If needs can be oberved
so that households can be divided into needy and non-needy groups, full compensation
for needs will be optimal if a separate tax schedule applies to the two groups. In that
case, compensation for needs will be a component of the optimal inter-group lump-sum
redistribution scheme. Then, the optimal tax schedule within each group will depend upon
the distribution of ability types in each group. In the simple case we consider in which
analytical results are possible, we ﬁnd that the tax should be more progressive in the group
with the highest proportion of high ability types.
On the other hand, if the government is restricted to a single economy-wide optimal tax
schedule, the treatment of needs depends on the correlation of needs with ability. If a
uniform credit for needs is used, it will exceed the level of needs if needs are negatively
correlated with ability. This is reminiscent of results elsewhere in the social insurance lit-
erature where medical care expenditures are subsidized if the risk of ill health is inversely
correlated with ability. Along the same lines, Cremer et al (2001) study optimal income de-
sign in a setting in which households diﬀer in both ability and an unobserved endowment.
The endowment plays a very similar role to needs here: persons with a smaller endowment
of a commodity have larger ‘needs’ for the commodity. They show how diﬀerential com-
modity tax system can improve welfare if used alongside the income tax in a setting in
which the well-known Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem otherwise applies. They also ﬁnd
that the self-selection constraints can take very surprising patterns. If, however, needs can
be diﬀerentiated by income level, needs will be over-compensated for low-ability house-
23holds, and under-compensated for high-ability households, regardless of the correlation
between needs and ability.
The results have some potential policy implications. The simplest one is that whenever
the population can be divided into identiﬁable groups with diﬀerent ability distributions,
it is optimal to have both separate income tax schedules in the diﬀerent groups and lump-
sum redistributive transfers from groups with a higher proportion of high-ability types to
those with a lower proportion. Moreover, the inter-group transfers should be augmented
to the extent that needs diﬀerences vary between groups. One obvious example of this
is a federation with regions of diﬀerent ability distributions. It is seemingly eﬃcient to
decentralize redistribution to the regional level, and restrict the federal government to
inter-regional equalization transfers based on ability levels, and if necessary, needs levels.
Of course, there will be two caveats to this prescription. First, if horizontal equity must
be respected, it might be necessary to impose a uniform tax schedule nationwide. And,
second, if households are mobile, so that ability distributions across regions are endogenous,
things become much more complicated.16
More generally, the analysis informs the issue of how costs for health and disability ex-
penditures ought to be accounted for in the income tax system. Assuming needs for these
expenditures can be observed, they can be used as part of a system of redistributing not
only in favor of high-need persons, but also in favor of low-ability persons.
16 For a general discussion of these issues, see Boadway (2004).
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Figure 5. The Pooled Outcome with Constant Absolute
Aversion to Inequality
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